Profit maximization mitigates competition

DOI10.1007/BF01212187zbMath0840.90019OpenAlexW2071160511MaRDI QIDQ1906033

Birgit Grodal, Egbert Dierker

Publication date: 4 July 1996

Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/bf01212187

zbMATH Keywords

Bertrand-Nash equilibria

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

General equilibrium theory (91B50)

Related Items (10)

Price normalization under imperfect competition ⋮ Shareholder voting ⋮ A general equilibrium analysis of corporate control and the stock market ⋮ Corporate self-regulation of imperfect competition ⋮ Ownership structure and efficiency in large economies ⋮ Macroeconomic effects of an indirect tax substitution ⋮ Multiplicity of Cournot equilibria and involuntary unemployment ⋮ Imperfectly competitive factor markets and price normalization ⋮ \(R\&D\) cooperation and growth ⋮ Shareholders' choice

Cites Work

• Nash equilibrium with strategic complementarities
• Rationalizability, Learning, and Equilibrium in Games with Strategic Complementarities
• A Theory of Dynamic Oligopoly, II: Price Competition, Kinked Demand Curves, and Edgeworth Cycles
• Unnamed Item

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