Singularity theory and core existence in the spatial model

DOI10.1016/0304-4068(94)00704-EzbMath0843.90006OpenAlexW1987160983MaRDI QIDQ1906056

Jeffrey S. Banks

Publication date: 19 August 1996

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-4068(94)00704-e

zbMATH Keywords

transversalityvoting gamecore existencedimension of the outcome spacesingularity approach

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12) Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Social choice (91B14) Spatial models in sociology (91D25)

Related Items

Necessary gradient restrictions at the core of a voting rule ⋮ Equilibrium existence for zero-sum games and spatial models of elections ⋮ Endogenous voting agendas ⋮ Repeated Downsian electoral competition ⋮ Toward a \(50\%\)-majority equilibrium when voters are symmetrically distributed ⋮ Coalitions and Catastrophic Climate Change ⋮ Social choice and electoral competition in the general spatial model ⋮ The probability of majority rule instability in the 2D Euclidean model with an even number of voters ⋮ Connections and Implications of the Ostrogorski Paradox for Spatial Voting Models ⋮ Dominance in spatial voting with imprecise ideals ⋮ Bounds for mixed strategy equilibria and the spatial model of elections ⋮ FUZZY BLACK'S MEDIAN VOTER THEOREM: EXAMINING THE STRUCTURE OF FUZZY RULES AND STRICT PREFERENCE

Cites Work

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• Social equilibrium and cycles on compact sets
• The structure of continuous-valued neutral monotonic social functions
• Structural instability of the core
• Generic properties of simple Bergson-Samuelson welfare functions
• Generic Instability of Majority Rule
• Generalized Symmetry Conditions at a Core Point

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