Pure strategies in games with private information
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Publication:1906064
DOI10.1016/0304-4068(94)00708-IzbMath0840.90137OpenAlexW2033480418WikidataQ126803161 ScholiaQ126803161MaRDI QIDQ1906064
Publication date: 6 February 1996
Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-4068(94)00708-i
private informationlarge gamescountably infinite actionspure strategy equilibriafinite player gamesinformational constraints
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