Stable matchings and rematching-proof equilibria in a two-sided matching market
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Publication:1906447
DOI10.1006/jeth.1995.1045zbMath0852.90015OpenAlexW2010309505MaRDI QIDQ1906447
Publication date: 18 March 1996
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1995.1045
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