Robust inference in communication games with partial provability
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Publication:1906449
DOI10.1006/jeth.1995.1046zbMath0843.90148OpenAlexW2050174083MaRDI QIDQ1906449
Barton L. Lipman, Duane J. Seppi
Publication date: 19 August 1996
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://semanticscholar.org/paper/aaeb8390d80306db54d2d319fde59f09fa4a7551
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