Resilient allocation rules for bilateral trade

DOI10.1006/JETH.1995.1049zbMath0843.90032OpenAlexW2038790086MaRDI QIDQ1906453

Roger D. Lagunoff

Publication date: 19 August 1996

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1995.1049

zbMATH Keywords

bilateral tradebilateral bargainingresilient allocation rulessequential equilibrium outcomes

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (2)

Equilibrium rejection of a mechanism ⋮ Interim third-party selection in bargaining

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