A simple forecasting mechanism for moral hazard settings

DOI10.1006/jeth.1995.1051zbMath0843.90029OpenAlexW2056239084MaRDI QIDQ1906455

Anil Arya, Jonathani Glover

Publication date: 12 February 1996

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1995.1051

zbMATH Keywords

second-best solutionmultiagent moral hazardtacit collusion problem

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Hierarchical games (including Stackelberg games) (91A65) Special types of economic equilibria (91B52)

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