Stability and the chain store paradox

DOI10.1006/jeth.1995.1053zbMath0843.90137OpenAlexW2037110410MaRDI QIDQ1906457

Srihari Govindan

Publication date: 12 February 1996

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1995.1053

zbMATH Keywords

Selten's chain store game

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (4)

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