Subgame perfect equilibrium of repeated games with implementation costs

DOI10.1006/jeth.1995.1058zbMath0842.90137OpenAlexW2010990988MaRDI QIDQ1906462

Luis G. Quintas, Alejandro Neme

Publication date: 12 February 1996

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1995.1058

zbMATH Keywords

repeated gamessubgame perfect equilibriumRubinstein model

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Related Items (3)

Game Theory and Strategic Complexity ⋮ Evolutionary stability in alternating-offers bargaining games ⋮ Uniqueness and efficiency of Nash equilibrium in a family of randomly generated repeated games.

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