A model of auction contracts with liquidated damages

DOI10.1006/JETH.1995.1084zbMath0841.90053OpenAlexW2034280584MaRDI QIDQ1906702

Keith Waehrer

Publication date: 24 July 1996

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1995.1084

zbMATH Keywords

auction modelewinning bidder

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

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Optimal bidding in auctions from a game theory perspective ⋮ Limited liability and mechanism design in procurement ⋮ Auctions with endogenous opting‐out fees and recursive winning procedures from the Talmud ⋮ Optimal procurement mechanisms: bidding on price and damages for breach ⋮ Analyzing auction and bargaining mechanisms in e-procurement with supply quality risk ⋮ OPTIMAL COST OVERRUNS: PROCUREMENT AUCTIONS WITH RENEGOTIATION ⋮ Credit auctions and bid caps ⋮ Multidimensional auctions for long-term procurement contracts with early-exit options: the case of conservation contracts ⋮ High bids and broke winners ⋮ Renewable auctions: bidding for real options ⋮ Participation and welfare in auctions with default

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