Power of voters and domain of preferences where voting by committees is strategy-proof

DOI10.1006/jeth.1995.1089zbMath0851.90009OpenAlexW2050834382MaRDI QIDQ1906707

Shigehiro Serizawa

Publication date: 6 February 1996

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1995.1089

zbMATH Keywords

voting by committeesstrategy-proof social choice functions

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (15)

Voting under constraints ⋮ A maximal domain for the existence of strategy-proof rules ⋮ Preference restrictions for simple and strategy-proof rules: local and weakly single-peaked domains ⋮ Committee formation under constraints through randomized voting rules on separable domains ⋮ Maximal domain for strategy-proof rules in allotment economies ⋮ Generalizing the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem: partial preferences, the degree of manipulation, and multi-valuedness ⋮ Maximal domain for strategy-proof probabilistic rules in economies with one public good ⋮ ON STRATEGY‐PROOFNESS AND THE SALIENCE OF SINGLE‐PEAKEDNESS ⋮ Maximal domain for strategy-proof rules with one public good ⋮ A maximal domain for strategy-proof and no-vetoer rules in the multi-object choice model ⋮ Coalitional strategy-proof house allocation ⋮ Maximal domain of preferences in the division problem ⋮ Random dictatorship domains ⋮ Strategy-proof voting on compact ranges ⋮ Collective Choice for Simple Preferences

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