On admissible strategies and manipulation of social choice procedures

DOI10.1007/BF01078983zbMath0845.90021MaRDI QIDQ1908005

Boniface Mbih

Publication date: 15 September 1996

Published in: Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

plurality ruledominationadmissible strategiescollective choice mechanismmanipulability results

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (1)

Manipulation of voting schemes with restricted beliefs

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Sophisticated voting outcomes and agenda control
• Outcomes of admissible Nash equilibria and sophisticated voting when decisions are based on pairwise comparisons
• Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
• Manipulation of social choice functions
• Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
• On a Difficulty in the Analysis of Strategic Voting

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