Pareto improvements by Pareto strategic voting under majority voting with risk loving and risk avoiding voters -- A note

DOI10.1007/BF01078985zbMath0845.90020MaRDI QIDQ1908007

I. D. A. Macintyre

Publication date: 28 February 1996

Published in: Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

simple majority votingsincere preferences

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12) Social choice (91B14)

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Manipulation under majority decision-making when no majority suffers and preferences are strict
• The Pareto rule and strategic voting
• Consistent Voting Systems

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