Weakly strict equilibria in finite normal form games

DOI10.1007/BF01720983zbMath0844.90118OpenAlexW2068404912WikidataQ61849380 ScholiaQ61849380MaRDI QIDQ1908037

P. E. M. Borm, Luciano Méndez-Naya, Ricardo Cao, Ignacio Garcia-Jurado

Publication date: 28 February 1996

Published in: OR Spektrum (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/bf01720983

zbMATH Keywords

undominated Nash equilibriumweakly strict equilibrium

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10)

Related Items (1)

Perfectly almost strict equilibria for finite games in strategic form

Cites Work

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• Persistent equilibria in strategic games
• On stability of perfect equilibrium points
• Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games
• Non-cooperative games
• On the Definition of the Strategic Stability of Equilibria
• Stable Equilibria—A Reformulation. Part II. Discussion of the Definition, and Further Results
• Stable Equilibria—A Reformulation
• On the Strategic Stability of Equilibria
• Equilibrium points in n -person games
• Refinements of the Nash equilibrium concept

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