Monetary and fiscal policy interaction and government debt stabilization

DOI10.1007/BF01226006zbMath0841.90054OpenAlexW1973719948WikidataQ57787509 ScholiaQ57787509MaRDI QIDQ1908515

Bas van Aarle, A. Lans Bovenberg, Matthias G. Raith

Publication date: 31 March 1996

Published in: Journal of Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/bf01226006

zbMATH Keywords

strategic interactionfiscal authoritiesmonetary authoritiesNash open-loop equilibriaStackelberg open-loop equilibria

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Hierarchical games (including Stackelberg games) (91A65) Differential games (aspects of game theory) (91A23) Macroeconomic theory (monetary models, models of taxation) (91B64)

Related Items (8)

On the open-loop Nash equilibrium in LQ-games ⋮ Identification of efficient subgame-perfect Nash equilibria in a class of differential games ⋮ SUSTAINABILITY OF COOPERATION OVERTIME IN LINEAR-QUADRATIC DIFFERENTIAL GAMES ⋮ Moving horizon control in dynamic games ⋮ Strategic interactions among central bank and national fiscal authorities in a monetary union subject to asymmetric country shocks ⋮ Computational aspects of the open-loop Nash equilibrium in linear quadratic games ⋮ Linear Quadratic Differential Games: An Overview ⋮ Credible Linear-Incentive Equilibrium Strategies in Linear-Quadratic Differential Games

Cites Work

• Fiscal policy coordination and EMU
• Dynamic noncooperative game theory

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