A characterization of the Walras rule
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Publication:1908524
DOI10.1007/BF00186278zbMath0847.90009MaRDI QIDQ1908524
Sang-Chul Suh, Ryo-Ichi Nagahisa
Publication date: 28 February 1996
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Related Items (14)
Axiomatic characterizations of the Walras correspondence for generalized economies ⋮ Double implementation by a simple game form in the commons problem ⋮ Cooperative production: A comparison of lower and upper bounds ⋮ Fairness and implementability in allocation of indivisible objects with monetary compensations ⋮ Implementability and equity in production economies with unequal skills ⋮ Horizontal equity and stability when the number of agents is variable in the fair division problem ⋮ Non-bossiness ⋮ Nash implementation of competitive equilibria in the job-matching market ⋮ Local strict envy-freeness in large economies ⋮ Competitive equilibrium as a bargaining solution: an axiomatic approach ⋮ Walrasian social orderings in exchange economies ⋮ Beyond Nash bargaining theory: The Nash set ⋮ Characterizations of the public and private ownership solutions ⋮ Characterizing natural implementability: The fair and Walrasian correspondences
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