Organizational strategy and tacit collusion in oligopoly with agency
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Publication:1908548
DOI10.1007/BF01307826zbMath0841.90021MaRDI QIDQ1908548
Praveen Kumar, Richard M. Cyert
Publication date: 24 July 1996
Published in: Computational \& Mathematical Organization Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Production theory, theory of the firm (91B38) Theory of organizations, manpower planning in operations research (90B70)
Cites Work
- Optimal cartel equilibria with imperfect monitoring
- Noncooperative Collusion under Imperfect Price Information
- An Example of a Repeated Partnership Game with Discounting and with Uniformly Inefficient Equilibria
- A Theory of Exit in Duopoly
- On the Theory of Infinitely Repeated Games with Discounting
- A Theory of Dynamic Oligopoly, I: Overview and Quantity Competition with Large Fixed Costs
- A Theory of Dynamic Oligopoly, II: Price Competition, Kinked Demand Curves, and Edgeworth Cycles
- A Non-cooperative Equilibrium for Supergames
- Steady State Learning and Nash Equilibrium
- Multiperiod Decision Models with Alternating Choice as a Solution to the Duopoly Problem
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