On the existence and formation of partnerships in a game

DOI10.1006/game.1996.0004zbMath0846.90131OpenAlexW2081109624MaRDI QIDQ1913285

Francesc Carreras

Publication date: 22 May 1996

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/game.1996.0004

zbMATH Keywords

Shapley valuevotingminimal winning coalitionspartnership in cooperative games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Voting theory (91B12)

Related Items (8)

Merging and splitting in cooperative games: some (im)possibility results ⋮ Stable governments and the semistrict core ⋮ Partnership formation and multinomial values ⋮ Alliances, partnerships and the Banzhaf semivalue ⋮ Axiomatizing the public good index via merging and new arrival properties ⋮ Partnership formation and binomial semivalues ⋮ Rejoinder on: Transversality of the Shapley value ⋮ On the convenience to form coalitions or partnerships in simple games

This page was built for publication: On the existence and formation of partnerships in a game