Pollination and reward: A game-theoretic approach

DOI10.1006/game.1996.0009zbMath0848.90150OpenAlexW1978855286MaRDI QIDQ1913292

Fernando Vega-Redondo

Publication date: 9 October 1996

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/game.1996.0009

zbMATH Keywords

evolutionevolutionarily stable statedynamic model of plant pollination

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Problems related to evolution (92D15) Applications of game theory (91A80)

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