Information transmission when the informed party is confused

DOI10.1006/GAME.1996.0010zbMath0844.90143OpenAlexW2023420517MaRDI QIDQ1913293

Joel Watson

Publication date: 22 May 1996

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/game.1996.0010

zbMATH Keywords

information transmissionsender-receiver gamestwo-sided incomplete informationfully revealing equilibria

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

2-person games (91A05) Applications of game theory (91A80) Economics of information (91B44)

Related Items (10)

Screening and Signaling in Communication* ⋮ Competition and uncertainty in a paper's news desk ⋮ Communication in Cournot oligopoly ⋮ Value of public information in sender-receiver games ⋮ False modesty: when disclosing good news looks bad ⋮ Professional advice ⋮ MULTISTAGE COMMUNICATION WITH AND WITHOUT VERIFIABLE TYPES ⋮ Evolving influence: mitigating extreme conflicts of interest in advisory relationships ⋮ Cheap talk when the receiver has uncertain information sources ⋮ Information transmission in nested sender-receiver games

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