The work of John F. Nash Jr. in game theory. Nobel seminar, 8 December 1994
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Publication:1913569
DOI10.1215/S0012-7094-95-08102-2zbMath0849.01037WikidataQ110829184 ScholiaQ110829184MaRDI QIDQ1913569
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Publication date: 8 July 1996
Published in: Duke Mathematical Journal (Search for Journal in Brave)
History of mathematics in the 20th century (01A60) Biographies, obituaries, personalia, bibliographies (01A70)
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Cites Work
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