Core theory for multiple-sided assignment games

DOI10.1215/S0012-7094-95-08106-XzbMath0849.90135MaRDI QIDQ1913575

William F. Lucas

Publication date: 21 May 1996

Published in: Duke Mathematical Journal (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

coreassignment gamescharacteristic function gamescharacterizations for nonempty cores

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12)

Related Items (4)

Analysis of the core of multisided Böhm-Bawerk assignment markets ⋮ A survey on assignment markets ⋮ Multi-sided assignment games on \(m\)-partite graphs ⋮ A note on the relationship between the core and stable sets in three-sided markets

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Axiomatic models of bargaining
• An algorithm for finding the nucleolus of assignment games
• Handbook of game theory with economic applications. Vol. 1
• The assignment game. I: The core
• Non-cooperative games
• The Bargaining Problem
• The Lattice of Core (Sub)Matchings in a Two-Sided Matching Market
• The Proof That a Game May Not Have a Solution
• College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage

This page was built for publication: Core theory for multiple-sided assignment games