Core, value and equilibria for market games: On a problem of Aumann and Shapley

DOI10.1007/BF01247098zbMath0852.90142OpenAlexW2065198006MaRDI QIDQ1914089

Erich Peter Klement, Dan Butnariu

Publication date: 2 June 1996

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/bf01247098

zbMATH Keywords

balancednessAumann-Shapley valuelarge classes of cooperative gamestransferable utility competitive equilibrium

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Games with infinitely many players (91A07)

Related Items (3)

Multiple equilibrium overnight rates in a dynamic interbank market game ⋮ Some mathematical aspects of fuzzy sets: Triangular norms, fuzzy logics, and generalized measures ⋮ Fuzzy coalition structures

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Values and cores of fuzzy games with infinitely many players
• Values of Non-Atomic Games

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