The Nakamura theorem for coalition structures of quota games

DOI10.1007/BF01247101zbMath0846.90132OpenAlexW2061391679MaRDI QIDQ1914092

Eyal Winter, Shlomo Weber, Rajat K. Deb

Publication date: 3 October 1996

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/bf01247101

zbMATH Keywords

free entryfree mobilityquota gameseffective coalitions\({\mathcal S}\)-equilibriumstable coalition structure

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Models of societies, social and urban evolution (91D10)

Related Items (3)

Bounds for the Nakamura number ⋮ Multiobjective interaction programming problem with interaction constraint for two players ⋮ Anytime coalition structure generation: an average case study

Cites Work

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• The vetoers in a simple game with ordinal preferences
• Strong Tiebout equilibrium under restricted preferences domain
• A note on balancedness and nonemptiness of the core in voting games
• Cooperative games with coalition structures
• Stable coalition structures with a unidimensional set of alternatives
• The Core of an N Person Game

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