The nonemptiness of the \(f\)-core of a game without side payments
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Publication:1914098
DOI10.1007/BF01247105zbMath0846.90140OpenAlexW1978283583MaRDI QIDQ1914098
Mamoru Kaneko, Myrna Holtz Wooders
Publication date: 2 June 1996
Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/bf01247105
Related Items (10)
Price controls, non-price quality competition, and the nonexistence of competitive equilibrium ⋮ On the core of normal form games with a continuum of players ⋮ Approximate cores of games and economies with clubs. ⋮ The structure of competitive equilibria in an assignment market ⋮ Small group effectiveness, per capita boundedness and nonemptiness of approximate cores ⋮ Some generalizations of Kajii's theorem to games with infinitely many players ⋮ On the nonemptiness of approximate cores of large games ⋮ The weak-core of a game in normal form with a continuum of players ⋮ Anonymous price taking equilibrium in Tiebout economies with a continuum of agents: existence and characterization ⋮ Stable matching with double infinity of workers and firms
Cites Work
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- Continuum economies with finite coalitions: Core, equilibria, and widespread externalities
- The core of a continuum economy with widespread externalities and finite coalitions: From finite to continuum economies
- The central assignment game and the assignment markets
- The core of a game with a continuum of players and finite coalitions: The model and some results
- The assignment game. I: The core
- Quasi-Cores in a Monetary Economy with Nonconvex Preferences
- College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
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