Multiperson bargaining over two alternatives

DOI10.1006/game.1996.0015zbMath0848.90142OpenAlexW2068015874MaRDI QIDQ1915701

József Sákovics, Clara Ponsatí

Publication date: 1 July 1996

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://semanticscholar.org/paper/615dca2e7424b3bc92b05635a78726c1ada84942

zbMATH Keywords

incomplete informationcontinuous-time modelperfect Bayesian equilibriamultiperson bargaining

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12)

Related Items (7)

Group decision-making in the shadow of disagreement ⋮ An experimental study of voting with costly delay ⋮ The unanimity rule under a two-agent fixed sequential order voting ⋮ Efficient voting with penalties ⋮ Alliances and negotiations ⋮ The representative Nash solution for two-sided bargaining problems ⋮ Chores.

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