Neighborhood stability in sender-receiver games

DOI10.1006/game.1996.0022zbMath0848.90127OpenAlexW2069318767MaRDI QIDQ1915705

Andreas Blume

Publication date: 5 August 1996

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/game.1996.0022

zbMATH Keywords

sender-receiver gamespartially separating equilibriaperturbed gamesperturbed message persistent

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

2-person games (91A05)

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