Manipulations by coalitions under asymmetric information: The case of Groves mechanisms

DOI10.1006/GAME.1996.0024zbMath0848.90136OpenAlexW1993245732MaRDI QIDQ1915707

Jacques Crémer

Publication date: 24 October 1996

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/game.1996.0024

zbMATH Keywords

asymmetry of informationmanipulation by subcoalitionsVickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanisms

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (4)

Coalition-proof full efficient implementation ⋮ On the equivalence of coalitional and individual strategy-proofness properties ⋮ Sweet lemons: mitigating collusion in organizations ⋮ Manipulation through bribes

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