Moral hazard, monitoring costs, and optimal government intervention

DOI10.1007/BF00353332zbMath0848.90039OpenAlexW2032698365MaRDI QIDQ1915787

Neil Bruce, Kar-Yiu Wong

Publication date: 24 October 1996

Published in: Journal of Risk and Uncertainty (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/bf00353332

zbMATH Keywords

insurancemoral hazardgovernment interventiongovernment regulationconsumption of risk-influencing goodsmonitor costs

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Macroeconomic theory (monetary models, models of taxation) (91B64)

Cites Work

• On normal hazard in general equilibrium theory
• Pareto Optima and Competitive Equilibria with Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard
• Effective Policy Tools and Quantity Controls
• A Competitive Efficiency Wage Model with Keynesian Features
• On Moral Hazard and Insurance

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