On games under expected utility with rank dependent probabilities
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Publication:1915811
DOI10.1007/BF00133158zbMath0848.90133OpenAlexW2048468785MaRDI QIDQ1915811
Publication date: 9 October 1996
Published in: Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/bf00133158
non-expected utilityexpected utilityrank dependent probabilitiesfixed setsnon-cooperative normal-form gamesset-valued solutions
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When the Players Are Not Expectation Maximizers, Nash equilibria for non-binary choice rules, Non-cooperative games with prospect theory players and dominated strategies, Minimizing expectation plus variance, Strategic games beyond expected utility, Equilibrium Notions for Agents with Cumulative Prospect Theory Preferences
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