Can we rationally learn to coordinate?

DOI10.1007/BF00133159zbMath0848.90138MaRDI QIDQ1915812

Maarten C. W. Janssen, Sanjeev Goyal

Publication date: 9 October 1996

Published in: Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

learningindividual rationalitycoordinationconventioncollective rationality

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Memory and learning in psychology (91E40)

Related Items (9)

Subjective games and equilibria ⋮ The optimal way to play the most difficult repeated two-player coordination games ⋮ When learning meets salience ⋮ An experimental investigation of optimal learning in coordination games ⋮ Minority voting and long-term decisions ⋮ Reciprocity and cooperation in repeated coordination games: The principled-player approach ⋮ Egalitarianism and efficiency in repeated symmetric games ⋮ Focal points in framed strategic forms ⋮ Coordination and learning with a partial language

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Adaptive and sophisticated learning in normal form games
• Weak and strong merging of opinions
• Bayesian learning and convergence to Nash equilibria without common priors
• Rational Learning Leads to Nash Equilibrium
• Subjective Equilibrium in Repeated Games
• Remarks on the Intrinsic Equations of Twisted Curves
• Learning How to Cooperate: Optimal Play in Repeated Coordination Games
• Learning, Mutation, and Long Run Equilibria in Games
• The Evolution of Conventions

This page was built for publication: Can we rationally learn to coordinate?