Mechanism robustness in multilateral bargaining

DOI10.1007/BF00133170zbMath0848.90146OpenAlexW2069791572MaRDI QIDQ1915818

Eyal Winter

Publication date: 1 July 1996

Published in: Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/bf00133170

zbMATH Keywords

coalitional stabilitymechanism robustnessrobustness of bargaining outcomes

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12)

Related Items (2)

Core implementation and increasing returns to scale for cooperation ⋮ A theory of endogenous coalition structures

Cites Work

• An axiomatization of the core of cooperative games without side payments
• Alternating bid bargaining with a smallest money unit
• Approaches to the Bargaining Problem Before and After the Theory of Games: A Critical Discussion of Zeuthen's, Hicks', and Nash's Theories
• Non-Cooperative Bargaining Theory: An Introduction
• Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model
• An Equilibrium-Point Interpretation of Stable Sets and a Proposed Alternative Definition
• A Noncooperative Theory of Coalitional Bargaining
• The Core of an N Person Game
• Two-Person Cooperative Games
• Unnamed Item

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