Deviations, dynamics, and equilibrium refinements

DOI10.1006/jeth.1996.0001zbMath0854.90145OpenAlexW2140761733WikidataQ57320390 ScholiaQ57320390MaRDI QIDQ1916280

Matthew Rabin, Joel Sobel

Publication date: 19 January 1997

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1996.0001

zbMATH Keywords

signalingrecurrent equilibria

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Economics of information (91B44)

Related Items

A dynamic model of equilibrium selection in signaling markets ⋮ Meaning and credibility in experimental cheap-talk games ⋮ Informal communication ⋮ Rich language and refinements of cheap-talk equilibria ⋮ Evolutions of communication with partial common interest ⋮ Equilibrium refinement vs. level-\(k\) analysis: An experimental study of cheap-talk games with private information ⋮ Equilibrium selection in experimental cheap talk games