Incentive-efficient equilibria of two-party sealed-bid bargaining games
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Publication:1916281
DOI10.1006/jeth.1996.0002zbMath0849.90134OpenAlexW1966044696MaRDI QIDQ1916281
Publication date: 3 July 1996
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1996.0002
Related Items (4)
A general characterization of interim efficient mechanisms for independent linear environments ⋮ Closure under interim utility equivalence implies two-agent Bayesian implementation ⋮ Optimal design for redistributions among endogenous buyers and sellers ⋮ Mediation: Incomplete information bargaining with filtered communication.
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