On the existence of optimal contract mechanisms for incomplete information principal-agent models

DOI10.1006/jeth.1996.0007zbMath0849.90043OpenAlexW2106483680MaRDI QIDQ1916287

Erik J. Balder

Publication date: 12 September 1996

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://dspace.library.uu.nl/handle/1874/2582

zbMATH Keywords

principal-agent modelsexistence of optimal contract selection mechanisms

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Hierarchical games (including Stackelberg games) (91A65) Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (7)

An equilibrium existence result for games with incomplete information and indeterminate outcomes ⋮ On the continuity of expected utility ⋮ Robust contracting in general contract spaces ⋮ The existence of an optimal deterministic contract in moral hazard problems ⋮ A unifying pair of Cournot-Nash equilibrium existence results ⋮ Existence of optimal auctions in general environments ⋮ Existence and monotonicity of solutions to moral hazard problems

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