Core and stable sets of large games arising in economics

DOI10.1006/jeth.1996.0010zbMath0849.90132OpenAlexW2015404441MaRDI QIDQ1916290

Ezra Einy, Benyamin Shitovitz, Ron Holzman, Dov Monderer

Publication date: 3 July 1996

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://semanticscholar.org/paper/9e195681c771637317296633c642c8e4bbd302b9

zbMATH Keywords

core of a non-atomic glove-market gamestable sets of large games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) General equilibrium theory (91B50)

Related Items (11)

Von Neumann-Morgenstern stable sets in matching problems ⋮ Von Neumann-Morgenstern stable sets of a patent licensing game: the existence proof ⋮ Stability of the core mapping in games with a countable set of players ⋮ The graph of Lindahl correspondence as the unique von Neumann-Morgenstern abstract stable set ⋮ Core equivalence theorems for infinite convex games ⋮ Symmetric von Neumann-Morgenstern stable sets in pure exchange economies. ⋮ Core and stable sets of exchange economies with externalities ⋮ Cooperative Games (Von Neumann-Morgenstern Stable Sets) ⋮ Convex vNM-stable sets for linear production games ⋮ Conservative stable standards of behavior and \(\varphi\)-stable sets ⋮ General systems and \(\varphi\)-stable sets --- a formal analysis of socioeconomic environments

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