Supergames played by finite automata with finite costs of complexity in an evolutionary setting

DOI10.1006/jeth.1996.0015zbMath0849.90137OpenAlexW1998056123MaRDI QIDQ1916295

David J. Cooper

Publication date: 7 November 1996

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1996.0015

zbMATH Keywords

finite automatafinite costs of complexityrepeated prisoners dilemma

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Problems related to evolution (92D15) Learning and adaptive systems in artificial intelligence (68T05) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Related Items (6)

Hamilton's rule ⋮ In and out of equilibrium. II: Evolution in repeated games with discounting and complexity costs ⋮ In and out of equilibrium. I: Evolution of strategies in repeated games with discounting. ⋮ Evolutionary stability and lexicographic preferences. ⋮ Leave and let leave: a sufficient condition to explain the evolutionary emergence of cooperation ⋮ In defense of DEFECT.

This page was built for publication: Supergames played by finite automata with finite costs of complexity in an evolutionary setting