Reputation in perturbed repeated games
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Publication:1919068
DOI10.1006/JETH.1996.0060zbMath0854.90150OpenAlexW2147712843MaRDI QIDQ1919068
Jonathan P. Thomas, Martin W. Cripps, Klaus M. Schmidt
Publication date: 1 August 1996
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/16388/1/16388.pdf
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