Sophisticated voting rules: The case of two tournaments

DOI10.1007/s003550050030zbMath0851.90011OpenAlexW4238909037MaRDI QIDQ1919688

Michael A. Trick, Sanjay Srivastava

Publication date: 24 July 1996

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s003550050030

zbMATH Keywords

voting rulesophisticated outcomes

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Individual preferences (91B08) Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (4)

Subgame perfect implementation: a full characterization ⋮ The learnability of voting rules ⋮ Single-Elimination Brackets Fail to Approximate Copeland Winner. ⋮ A new perspective on implementation by voting trees

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