Partially efficient voting by committees

DOI10.1007/s003550050034zbMath0851.90010OpenAlexW4245226870MaRDI QIDQ1919693

Ken-Ichi Shimomura

Publication date: 24 July 1996

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s003550050034

zbMATH Keywords

simple gamesvoting by committeessequence of efficiency conditions

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12) Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (2)

Efficient and strategy-proof voting rules: A characterization ⋮ A maximal domain for strategy-proof and no-vetoer rules in the multi-object choice model

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