On the role of commitment in a principal-agent relationship with an informed principal

DOI10.1006/JETH.1996.0028zbMath0852.90055OpenAlexW2122125223MaRDI QIDQ1920919

Peter-Jürgen Jost

Publication date: 6 August 1996

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1996.0028

zbMATH Keywords

private informationprincipal-agent relationshipextensive-form games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Hierarchical systems (93A13) Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (5)

Optimal contracts with random monitoring ⋮ Comparing allocations under asymmetric information: Coase theorem revisited ⋮ Informed-principal problem with moral hazard, risk neutrality, and no limited liability ⋮ The fog of fraud -- mitigating fraud by strategic ambiguity ⋮ Dynamic contracts with random monitoring

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