Ranking auctions with risk adverse bidders

DOI10.1006/jeth.1996.0031zbMath0852.90057OpenAlexW2055820467MaRDI QIDQ1920923

James L. Smith, Dan Levin

Publication date: 6 August 1996

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1996.0031

zbMATH Keywords

independent value auctionsrisk-averse bidders

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (12)

Auctions with uncertain numbers of bidders ⋮ Auctioning risk: the all-pay auction under mean-variance preferences ⋮ Competing first-price and second-price auctions ⋮ Auctions with selective entry ⋮ Second-price auctions with private entry costs ⋮ A method for identifying parameterizations of the compensation election and quadratic voting that admit pure-strategy equilibria ⋮ Premium auctions and risk preferences ⋮ Inference of bidders' risk attitudes in ascending auctions with endogenous entry ⋮ Informed entry in auctions ⋮ Revenue equivalence revisited ⋮ Risk aversion and optimal reserve prices in first- and second-price auctions ⋮ Equilibria in first price auctions with participation costs

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