Inequality reducing properties of composite taxation

DOI10.1006/jeth.1996.0038zbMath0852.90058OpenAlexW1981713347MaRDI QIDQ1920927

Alain Trannoy, Patrick Moyes, Michel Le Breton

Publication date: 9 December 1996

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://semanticscholar.org/paper/947bf0ecaea7d15c0aef4a42520e48dbe18acd07

zbMATH Keywords

income distributionstax systemsegalitarian principle

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Macroeconomic theory (monetary models, models of taxation) (91B64)

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BANKRUPTCY RULES AND COALITIONAL MANIPULATION ⋮ Talents, preferences and income inequality ⋮ Market demand elasticity and income inequality ⋮ Inequality minimising subsidy and taxation ⋮ ERRATUM: "BANKRUPTCY RULES AND COALITIONAL MANIPULATION" ⋮ Strategy-proof cost sharing, ability to pay and free provision of an indivisible public good. ⋮ Voting over piece-wise linear tax methods ⋮ Characterizations of egalitarian binary relations as transitive closures with a special reference to Lorenz dominance and to single-crossing conditions ⋮ Redistributive effects of minimal equal sacrifice taxation. ⋮ Lorenz dominance for transformed income distributions: a simple proof

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