A bargaining model based on the commitment tactic

DOI10.1006/jeth.1996.0041zbMath0852.90139OpenAlexW2163695070MaRDI QIDQ1920931

Abhinay Muthoo

Publication date: 9 December 1996

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1996.0041

zbMATH Keywords

unique Nash equilibriumone-shot, simultaneous-move bargaining game

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12)

Related Items (20)

Multilateral bargaining with concession costs ⋮ Partial commitment in an endogenous timing duopoly ⋮ Saving costs and improving selling through competitor cooperation in sourcing ⋮ Bargaining and waning commitments ⋮ Commitment in alternating offers bargaining ⋮ Tough negotiations: bilateral bargaining with durable commitments ⋮ Bargaining with revoking costs ⋮ FIRM SIZE AND PRICING POLICY ⋮ Game-theoretic analysis of cooperation among supply chain agents: Review and extensions ⋮ Rent-seeking and surplus destruction in unanimity bargaining ⋮ Capacity allocation under downstream competition and bargaining ⋮ Alternative equilibria in two-period ultimatum bargaining with envy ⋮ Bargaining and negative externalities ⋮ Tax contracts, party bargaining, and government formation ⋮ Collaborative R\&D and pricing policy of supply chain under the selection behavior of heterogeneous customer ⋮ Delegation and threat in bargaining ⋮ Group bargaining in supply chains ⋮ BARGAINING POWER IN THE NASH DEMAND GAME AN EVOLUTIONARY APPROACH ⋮ Rewarding moderate behavior in a dynamic Nash demand game ⋮ Bargaining with imperfect commitment

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