Multi-sided pre-play communication by burning money

DOI10.1006/jeth.1996.0043zbMath0852.90133OpenAlexW2297632394MaRDI QIDQ1920933

Sjaak Hurkens

Publication date: 15 December 1996

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://pure.uvt.nl/portal/en/publications/multisided-preplay-communication-by-burning-money(07474a9e-2329-4384-9e00-2846d20843de).html

zbMATH Keywords

burning moneyrational behaviorcostly messages

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

2-person games (91A05) Economics of information (91B44)

Related Items (10)

The effects of costless pre-play communication: experimental evidence from games with Pareto-ranked equilibria ⋮ On the strategic value of `shooting yourself in the foot': an experimental study of burning money ⋮ Communication, risk, and efficiency in games ⋮ Admissibility and common belief. ⋮ Stochastic better-reply dynamics in finite games ⋮ A note on pre-play communication ⋮ Epistemically robust strategy subsets ⋮ Language and coordination games ⋮ Noisy communication and the evolution of cooperation ⋮ Self-serving cheap talk: a test of Aumann's conjecture

This page was built for publication: Multi-sided pre-play communication by burning money