Extraction of surplus under adverse selection: The case of insurance markets

DOI10.1006/JETH.1996.0049zbMath0852.90049OpenAlexW2043675160MaRDI QIDQ1920939

Michael Landsberger, Isaac Meilijson

Publication date: 9 December 1996

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1996.0049

zbMATH Keywords

two types of risk averse agentsprincipal-agent setting

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Hierarchical systems (93A13)

Related Items (1)

The optimal insurance policy for the general fixed cost of handling an indemnity under rank-dependent expected utility

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