Implementation of stable solutions to marriage problems
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Publication:1920940
DOI10.1006/jeth.1996.0050zbMath0852.90011OpenAlexW2013172206MaRDI QIDQ1920940
Publication date: 9 December 1996
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://www.ivie.es/downloads/docs/wpasad/wpasad-1995-05.pdf
stable allocationsGale-Shapley mechanismstable outcomes for marriage marketsundominated Nash equilibria
Related Items (42)
Favoring Eagerness for Remaining Items: Designing Efficient, Fair, and Strategyproof Mechanisms ⋮ Minimal consistent enlargements of the immediate acceptance rule and the top trading cycles rule in school choice ⋮ Constrained school choice ⋮ Coalitional stability in the location problem with single-dipped preferences: an application of the minimax theorem ⋮ Beyond the Spanish MIR with consent: (hidden) cooperation and coordination in matching ⋮ Improving schools through school choice: a market design approach ⋮ Implementation in generalized matching problems ⋮ Games of manipulation in marriage problems ⋮ Manipulation via capacities in two-sided matching markets ⋮ A finite decentralized marriage market with bilateral search ⋮ Matching markets under (in)complete information ⋮ Sincere and sophisticated players in an equal-income market ⋮ Take-it-or-leave-it contracts in many-to-many matching markets ⋮ Maximal manipulation of envy-free solutions in economies with indivisible goods and money ⋮ Let them cheat! ⋮ Games of capacity manipulation in hospital-intern markets ⋮ Implementation in the many-to-many matching market. ⋮ Subgame perfect implementation of stable matchings in marriage problems ⋮ A further note on the college admission game ⋮ Manipulability in school choice ⋮ Two-Sided Matching Models ⋮ Non-bossiness ⋮ Partial strategyproofness: relaxing strategyproofness for the random assignment problem ⋮ Decentralized job matching ⋮ The positive consequence of strategic manipulation in indivisible good allocation ⋮ The stability of the equilibrium outcomes in the admission games induced by stable matching rules ⋮ Noncooperative formation of coalitions in hedonic games ⋮ In search of advice for participants in matching markets which use the deferred-acceptance algorithm ⋮ Manipulation via capacities revisited ⋮ Subgame perfect equilibria under the deferred acceptance algorithm ⋮ School choice: Nash implementation of stable matchings through rank-priority mechanisms ⋮ Hiring mechanisms, application costs and stability ⋮ Hiring procedures to implement stable allocations ⋮ Priority-driven behaviors under the Boston mechanism ⋮ On the terminology of economic design: a critical assessment and some proposals ⋮ The role of unions in hiring procedures for job markets ⋮ Simple mechanisms to implement the core of college admissions problems ⋮ Implementable stable solutions to pure matching problems ⋮ Implementing matching rules by type pretension mechanisms ⋮ The modified Boston mechanism ⋮ A simple selling and buying procedure ⋮ Implementation by self-relevant mechanisms: Applications.
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