Equilibria and Pareto optimal of markets with adverse selection
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Publication:1920944
DOI10.1007/BF01213903zbMath0852.90030MaRDI QIDQ1920944
Publication date: 9 December 1996
Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Related Items (21)
Security design without verifiable retention ⋮ An incentive efficient market for mechanisms in large Akerlof economies ⋮ On Rothschild-Stiglitz as competitive pooling ⋮ Competitive screening in insurance markets with endogenous wealth heterogeneity ⋮ Competitive equilibrium with search frictions: a general equilibrium approach ⋮ Signaling in dynamic markets with adverse selection ⋮ Wages as signals of worker mobility ⋮ General equilibrium in markets for lemons ⋮ Refinements and incentive efficiency in Walrasian models of insurance economies ⋮ Competitive markets with private information on both sides ⋮ Does competitive pricing cause market breakdown under extreme adverse selection? ⋮ General equilibrium in economies with adverse selection ⋮ On signalling and screening in markets with asymmetric information ⋮ A GAME THEORETIC FOUNDATION OF COMPETITIVE EQUILIBRIA WITH ADVERSE SELECTION ⋮ Signaling in markets with two-sided adverse selection ⋮ Matching markets with adverse selection ⋮ (Neutrally) optimal mechanism under adverse selection: the canonical insurance problem ⋮ INCENTIVE EFFICIENT PRICE SYSTEMS IN LARGE INSURANCE ECONOMIES WITH ADVERSE SELECTION ⋮ Constrained efficiency with adverse selection and directed search ⋮ Competitive equilibria with asymmetric information ⋮ Unimprovable allocations in economies with incomplete information
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