A lower bound on computational complexity given by revelation mechanisms

DOI10.1007/BF01213904zbMath0854.68045MaRDI QIDQ1920945

Stanley Reiter, Kenneth R. Mount

Publication date: 20 October 1996

Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

computational complexity

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Analysis of algorithms and problem complexity (68Q25) General equilibrium theory (91B50) Boolean functions (06E30)

Related Items (2)

Computational implementation ⋮ Implementing a generic smooth function

Cites Work

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• An Axiomatic Characterization of the Price Mechanism
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• A note on the interrelation of subsets of independent variables of a continuous function with continuous first derivatives

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