Two characterizations of the uniform rule for division problems with single-peaked preferences

DOI10.1007/BF01213907zbMath0852.90009MaRDI QIDQ1920948

Oscar Volij, H. J. M. Peters, Gertjan D. Otten

Publication date: 6 August 1996

Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

independence of irrelevant alternativessingle-peaked preferencesuniform rulerestricted monotonicitylexicographic egalitarian bargaining solutions

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Individual preferences (91B08)

Related Items (5)

The replacement principle in economies with single-peaked preferences ⋮ Two derivations of the uniform rule and an application to bankruptcy ⋮ The separability principle in single-peaked economies with participation constraints ⋮ The separability principle in economies with single-peaked preferences ⋮ A characterization of the uniform rule with several commodities and agents

Cites Work

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• The Bargaining Problem
• The Division Problem with Single-Peaked Preferences: A Characterization of the Uniform Allocation Rule

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